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Abstract
This paper examines the pricing strategy of private airports. To capture the relationship between 
airport fees and airport locations, we develop a model with the asymmetric hub-spoke network. We 
obtain the following results. First, spoke airports which are far from the hub set their airport fees 
low. Second, the hub airport offers a large discount for transit passengers when the average distance 
between the hub and spokes is long. Finally, when all cities possess the same population, the policy 
maker can improve social welfare by allowing the hub to discriminate transit passengers in the 
setting of airport fees.
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1.  Introduction
After the liberalization in the aviation industry, the networks of airlines changed from the point-to-
point to the hub-spoke design. As a result, passengers departing from airports at a spoke node (spoke 
airport) now have to transit at a hub when they travel. This transit at the hub imposes some additional 
costs on passengers from spoke airports. Therefore, transit passengers incur larger trip cost than 
those departing from hub airports. The cost related to the transit may include the airport fee payment; 
that is, transit passengers have to pay the airport fees at the departing spoke and hub airports. 
However, hub airport operators offer a discounted fee for transit passengers. Figure 1 summarizes 
the ratio of the discounted transit airport fee against the departing airport fee for the five largest 
airports in Europe in 2011: London Heathrow (LHR), Charles de Gaulle (CDG), Frankfurt (FRA), 
Amsterdam (AMS) and Madrid (MAD). In Figure 1, the degree of the discount differs among these 
five airports: LHR offers the highest transit fee, 82% of the departing fee, while MAD offers the 
lowest, 53% of the departing fee. Here, the fees include both airline fees (landing fees, noise charges 
and parking charges) and passenger fees (the Passenger Service Facility Charge (PSFC) and 
Passenger Security Service Charge (PSSC)). The object of discount is the latter.
The formation of the hub-spoke network may also affect the spoke airport fee. Figure 2 shows 
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the relationship between the fee of European airports and the minimal distance to the five largest 
airports in Europe: LHR, CDG, FRA, AMS, and MAD. Each dot represents an European airport 
with more than one million passengers in 2011, while the bold line in Figure 2 represents the fitted 
line. The fitted line may suggest that the airport fee decreases as the minimal distance to the major 
hubs increases. This paper aims to clarify the mechanisms of the data presented in Figures 1 and 2; 
that is, (i) why do spoke airports, which are farther from the hubs, set their airport fees lower and (ii) 
what is the determinant of the discount rate for the transit passengers offered by hub airports?
*This figure compares the fees of departing and transit passengers from a B787 passenger jet (280 seats). To 
compute the fees, we use the IATA Airport, ATC and Fuel Charges Monitor (IATA, 2013) and set several 
assumptions: the aircraft utilises the parking for three hours during the daytime; the loading factor is 71%; 
and the MTOW (Maximum Takeoff Weight) is 301 t.
Figure 1: The ratio of the transit fee against the departing fee* 
*: This figure demonstrates the departing fees for passengers boarding a B787 passenger jet (280 seats) for 
European international airports, which are appeared in the IATA Airport, ATC and Fuel Charges Monitor 
(IATA, 2013). In computing the airport charges, we set the same assumptions as in Figure1. 
Figure 2: The relationship between the airport fee and the distance to the hub* 
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Focusing on the relationship between airports, by its nature, the services provided by airports 
may become the substitute or the complementary goods. In case of the substitute goods, airports 
compete for passengers from the common catchment area; therefore, the airport fees become the 
strategic complements (for example, Czerny et al. (2014) and Teraji and Morimoto (2014)).1 When 
passengers utilize a pair of airports as the origin and destination, the airport services are the 
complementary goods. In such case, the airport fees become the strategic substitutes (Mantin (2012) 
and Matsumura and Matsushima (2012)).2 In order to explain the mechanism behind Figures 1 and 
2, we employ the second approach: namely, the airports are the complementary goods.
In terms of network structures, most papers that focus on airports in complementary goods 
relationship consider a network with one hub airport and two spoke airports. Based on this network, 
Lin (2013) treated pricing strategy of privatized airport to analyze airport congestion problem. 
Brueckner (2005) expanded the network to two hab airports and two spoke airports in order to 
capture decisions of network carriers. However, this type of networks has a problem that it is 
impossible to analyze effects of distance between airports on pricing strategy. Oum et.al. (1996) 
established a model of network with one hub airport and arbitrary number of spoke airports. 
Kawasaki (2014) applied this network for relationship among international hub and domestic spoke 
airports. However, their network structures are symmetric and distances from spoke airports to the 
hub are the same.
This paper also besed on the network of Oum et.al. (1996) and improved it to “asymmetric” 
structure. That is, spoke airports locate at an arbitrary distance from the hub. Using this model, we 
analyze how distance between the hub and spoke airports affects airport charges.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model, which is 
used to clarify the reason why spoke airports that are farther from the hubs set their airport fees 
lower and what affects the discount rate for the transit passengers at hub airports. In Section 3, we 
solve the game among airports and compare the analytical results with some stylized facts described 
above. In Section 4, we derive the welfare effect for each spoke market and analyse how the distance 
to the hub affects the welfare loss of each market. In Section 5, we suggest the discriminatory pricing 
policy to improve the social welfare. Finally, Section 6 states concluding remarks.
2.  The Model
Let us consider a situation in which an airline connects S+1 airports with a foreign country by 
forming a hub-spoke network as shown in Figure 3.3 In Figure 3, γs represents the distance between 
the hub and each spoke s, and we normalize the distance between the hub and foreign country to 1. 
Hereafter, we refer to the hub airport as Airport h, each spoke airport as Airport s (s=1,2,…,S ), and 
City i (i=h and 1,2,…,S ) is the city in which Airport i is located. The population of City i is 
represented by ni and we normalize the population of City h to 1, nh =1.
1  Czerny et al. (2014) focued on the case where the two ports compete for the demand from the third region and evaluate 
the welfare effects of the port privatization. Teraji and Morimoto (2014) dealt with the competition of airports to become a 
regional hub. In their model, two airports locate in a same country and compete for the international trip demand from the 
country. 
2  Similar to Czerny et al. (2014), Mantin (2012) and Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) evaluated the welfare effects of 
the airport privatization. Different from Czerny et al. (2014), however, they dealt with the situation where the two airports 
constitute the origin-destination pair. 
3  Long-haul flights from Airport h to the foreign county represent flights such as those from Europe to Asia or to the United 
States. 
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The economy has three agents: the airports, the airline, and consumers. The sequence of 
decisions among these agents is as follows. First, all airports set their airport fees simultaneously to 
maximize their revenue. Second, the airline sets its fares to maximize its profit. Finally, consumers 
in each city decide their demand for flights to the foreign country. Hereafter, we trace the decision-
making process.
The demand for air services is
                                                                
 
where pi denotes the airfare. ad and at denote the airport fees of the hub for the departing 
passengers and for the transit passengers, respectively. We call the former “departing fee” and the 
latter “transit fee.” In (1.2), as is the airport fee of a spoke airport. Hereafter, we refer to passengers 
departing from Airport h as “hub passengers” and passengers departing from Airport s as “spoke 
passengers.”
The airline creates the hub-spoke network and provides two types of flights, connecting flights 
between Airport h and each spoke airport, and direct flights between Airport h and the foreign 
country. We assume that the airline’s operating cost is proportional to the passenger-kilometer. 
Specifically, operating cost per passenger is cγs for the connecting flight and c for the direct flight. 
The total operating cost is
.                                                                 
The first term is the operating cost for shipping hub passengers and the second term is the 
operating cost for shipping spoke passengers. Here, we assume that the airline does not pay airport 
fees. In reality, while airlines pay airport fees such as landing, aircraft parking and handling fees, 
they are shifted onto passengers through the airfare. Therefore, the equilibrium demand and social 
welfare are given just as functions of total airport fees (= the sum of all the fees levied by airport 
operators). Therefore, in our model, only passengers pay airport fees. Similar assumptions are used 
in Oum et al. (1996) and Kawasaki (2014).
Using (2), we obtain the airline’s profit as
Figure 3: Hub–Spoke Network 
Distance:  
Foreign country Distance: 1 Airport h 
Airport s 
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.                                                                 
The first term is the profit from hub passengers and the second term is the profit from spoke 
passengers. The airline sets its airfare  to maximize profit:max  
Each airport levies airport fees on passengers. Total fee revenue is computed as
5.1  
 
The first term of (5.1) is the revenue from hub passengers and the second term is from spoke 
passengers. We ignore airports’ operating cost; therefore, private airports set their airport fees to 
maximize their fee revenue, that is, max Rh for the hub and  max Rs  for the spokes. 
 
3.  Equilibrium
This section derives the equilibrium airport fees in the hub-spoke network. Furthermore, we verify 
the stylized facts given in Figures 1 and 2; specifically, whether the distance to the hub affects the 
airport fees of each spoke airport and whether the hub operator reduces its transit fee as the network 
size expands. Subsection 3.1 derives the airfares and the demand whereas Subsection 3.2 solves the 
game among airports. Finally, Subsection 3.3 uses these solutions to check if the two stylized facts 
work in our setting.
3.1.  The Airline’s Choice
By solving the airline’s profit maximization problem, we obtain the equilibrium airfares:
2 ,                                                               
2 .                                                               
Substituting these two equations into (1), we rewrite the demand as a function of airport fees, ad, at, 
and as:
2 ,                                                               
2 .                                                               
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Hereafter, we assume that all spoke routes have the positive potential demand:
2 ,                                                               
2 .                                                               
 
3.2.  Equilibrium Airport Fees
Solving each airport’s revenue maximizing problem, we obtain the best response functions as 
follows:
2 ,                                                              
2 12 ̅ ∑∑
2 8.3  
Here, , ̅ ≡ ∑ ∑⁄   is the population-weighted average distance between the hub 
and spokes. According to (8), we obtain Lemma 1:
Lemma 1
The transit fee of the hub and the airport fee of spoke airports are strategic substitutes.
For spoke passengers, airport services at the hub and each spoke are complementary goods. 
Therefore, if one airport increases its fee, the other airport has to decreases its fee.
By solving (8), we obtain the equilibrium airport fees as
2 ,                                                               
̅3 ,                                                               
3 16 ̅ .                                                               
3.3.  Pricing Strategies of Private Airports
In this subsection, we discuss pricing strategies by focusing on the distance. We start with 
airport fees of spoke airports. Hereafter, Airport s' is farther from the hub than Airport s, that is, 
γs' > γs. From (9.2), we obtain
　　 
6 ̅ 6 ̅  
2  
This result is summarized in Proposition 1.
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Proposition 1
Airport fees of the spoke airport decreases as the distance to the hub, γs , increases.
Demand for connecting flights decreases and becomes more elastic as the distance between a spoke 
airport and the hub increases because airfares become higher due to the airline’s higher operating 
cost. Therefore, the spoke airport lowers its airport fee to boost demand. This result explains the 
fitted line in Figure 2. When the distance to the hub is long, the spoke airport chooses the lower 
airport fee, which offsets the higher airfare and increases the demand.
We move to pricing strategies of the hub airport and investigate the discount for transit 
passengers. According to (8.1) and (9.1), we obtain the ratio of the transit fee to departing fee as 
follows: 23 3 ̅ .                                                               
Differentiating (10) with respect to γ, we obtain Proposition 2.
Proposition 2
The ratio of the transit fee to the departing fee decreases as the weighted average distance, γ, 
increases.
The hub lowers its transit fee and compensates for higher airfare of spoke routes to attract more 
transit passengers when spoke airports are located far from the hub. On the other hand, the departing 
fee is independent from the location pattern of spoke airports. Therefore, the transit fee gets relatively 
small compared to the departing fee as the average distance becomes large. Note that in Figure 1, the 
discount ratio of MAD is the lowest among the five largest airports. This can be interpreted as 
follows. Since MAD locates at the fringe of Europe compared to the other four airports, the operator 
of MAD discounts the transit fee more than the others to attract more transit passengers from spoke 
airports.
4.  Welfare Analysis
This section clarifies the effect of distance to the hub upon the social welfare for each spoke route. 
To deal with this problem, we designate Route s as the route from Airport s to the foreign country 
via the hub. We define the social welfare for Route s as the gross consumer benefit minus the social 
cost. 12 .                                                               
The first term is the lower part of the inverse demand function and the second term is the operating 
cost. The social welfare in the equilibrium is 4
∗ 1288 .                                                               
Here, ere,  and ̅ . Since we consider the case of fixed airline network 
4  Detailed process of the derivation is summarized in Appendix A. 
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in this paper, demand should be positive for all routes. Thus, Xs is positive for all s and then Y > 0. 
At the optimum, airfare should be equal to the airline’s marginal cost, and airport fees should be 
zero. Therefore, the social welfare at the optimum, , is , is5 
∗
 512 .                                                               
The welfare loss is 
, is5 
∗, and we define the welfare loss ratio on Route s as
≡
∗
 1144 14  
This ratio indicates the degree of market distortion. A large θs means large welfare loss and large 
market distortion.
To analyze the relationship between the welfare loss and the distance, let us compare the two 
spoke airports, s and s' (γs’ > γs). From (14), we can state
　　　　
1144 18 1 1 1 1  
Since, , : therefore, . From this, 
Since, 
1144 18 1 1 1 1  
Since, , : therefore, . From this, 
we obtain Proposition 3.
Proposition 3
The welfare loss ratio, θs, increases as the distance between the hub and spoke, γs, increases.
5  See Appendix A for the derivation of these social welfare functions. 
Figure 4: Welfare Loss for Route s 
Welfare Loss 
Fare, Cost 
Demand
 
 
NBF 
Total 
Markup 
Demand function
1 
Marginal Cost 
A 
B C 
D 
E 
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This result is derived from the hub’s transit fee which is identical for all transit passengers. To clarify 
this mechanism, we define the “Net Benefit of the First trip (NBFs)” and the “Total Markup (TMs).” 
NBFs captures the net social gain of the first trip along Route s, which is computed as the highest 
willingness to pay (equal to unity) minus marginal cost of the flight operation, (1+γs)c. That is, NBFs 
=1−(1+γs)c. TMs captures the aggregate private gains of the airline, the hub and Airport s: that is,
2  
12 9 12 12  
In Figure 4, the area CDE is the welfare loss and the area ABE is the social welfare at the 
optimum. Therefore, according to Figure 4, the welfare loss ratio is written as θs =(TMs/NBFs)2. 
While both TMs and NBFs are decreasing in γs, the decrease of TMs is less significant than NBFs due 
to the identical transit fee at the hub. Therefore, θs is increasing in γs.
5.  Discriminatory Airport Fee Policy
Proposition 3 shows that the relative welfare loss is increasing with the distance to the hub due 
to the uniform transit fee at the hub. To avoid the welfare loss due to uniform pricing for transit 
passengers, we consider the case where the hub can set its transit fee for each spoke route separately 
according to the demand elasticity. We call this case “discriminatory fee case.” In this case, the hub’s 
revenue maximizing problem is reduced to maximize the fee revenue for each route. That is,
　　 max . 
2 . 
Here, at,s is the transit fee for Route s passengers. The best response is
　　 
max . 
2 . 
Using the spoke’s best response in (8.3), we obtain the transit fee as
　　 3 . 
In the discriminatory fee scheme, 
3 . 
 is computed as:
5 6 6  
In contrast, the total markup under the uniform fee scheme, 12 12 6 12 .  , is computed in (15). In comparison of these two,
　　 12 12 6 12 . 
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This indicates that, for the routes where γs > γ, the discriminatory fee scheme improves the 
economic welfare. This is because, in these routes, the discriminatory fee scheme results in the 
airport fee payments reduction6 and the lower total mark up. In contrast, due to the rise in the airport 
fee payments, the economic welfare of the routes for γs < γ  is decreased when the discriminatory fee 
scheme is introduced.
Next, we focus on change in the welfare loss of the entire network. Because the welfare loss for each 
route is expressed as the triangle CDE in Figure 4, the loss for each is calculated as 2⁄ . 
Aggregating the loss for all routes, the differential in the welfare loss of the entire network under the 
two alternative fee schemes is computed as:7
2 .                                                              17  
If this sign is negative, the discriminatory fee scheme is more efficient than the uniform scheme; that 
is, the discriminatory fee scheme improves the economic welfare. 
Although the sign of (17) may depend on the difference in the aggregate demand between the 
two alternatives, it is difficult to derive a clear result without assuming the population distribution. 
Therefore, we focus on the case where all spoke cities have the same population, that is, ns = n. We 
rewrite (17) as: 1 18  
where σ 2 is the variance of γs.8 This result is summarised as follows:
Proposition 4
When all the spoke cities have an identical population size, the discriminatory fee scheme is more 
efficient than the uniform scheme in terms of the entire welfare.
As shown in Proposition 4, when all the spoke cities have an identical population size, the 
policy maker can improve social welfare by allowing hub airports to discriminate passengers in 
setting airport fees. However in reality, price discrimination is banned in many countries. For 
example, the EU Airport Charges Directive (2009/12/EC) prohibits differentiated fees to airlines 
using the same service. In the US, airports are compelled to offer same fees for same service by 2013 
FAA’s Policy Regarding Airport Rates and Charges. In some situation, however, Proposition 4 states 
that the uniform fee scheme harms the economic welfare.
6  The differentials in the fees incurred by transit passengers in two cases are computed as:13 ̅  16 ̅  
Superscripts u and d indicate the uniform fee and the discriminatory fee cases, respectively. Also note that the fees under 
the uniform case (with the superscript u ) are derived as in (9).
7  Since, under the two alternative fee schemes, the hub passengers incur the same level of airfare and airport fee, the loss at 
the hub airport remains at the same level; therefore, we ignore the change in the loss at the hub. 
8  See Appendix B for derivation of (18). 
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6.  Conclusion
In this study, we analyzed airport pricing in an asymmetric hub-spoke network and obtained three 
results. First, the airport fees of a spoke airport decrease as the distance to the hub increases. This is 
because the demand from the spoke airport gets relatively smaller as the distance between the spoke 
and the hub increases, due to the high operating cost and airfare. Second, the ratio of the transit fee 
to the departing fee diminishes as the weighted average distance increases. Demand of a spoke route 
is a decreasing function of the distance. Therefore, the hub lowers its transit fee in attempt to boost 
the demand for transit services when spoke airports locate farther from the hub. Third, the welfare 
loss ratio increases as the distance between the hub and spoke increases. The mark-up ratio of a long 
spoke route is large due to the identical transit fee. Due to the large mark-up ratio, the welfare loss 
ratio also becomes large. Moreover, we showed the possibility that the discriminatory fee scheme 
improves the social welfare.
We need to extend our model in two aspects. First, we should establish a multi-hub model. It is 
often observed that some large airports compete for hub positions. Such competitions lead to 
discounting of airport fees. Second, we should consider airport groups and alliances among airports. 
If some airports are in one group or operated by a parent company, airport operators try to maximize 
the total profit of their group or company.
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Appendix A: Derivation of social welfareAppendix A: Derivation of social welfare 
(i) The social welfare in the equilibrium 
Plugging (1.2) into (11), we obtain 12  
Plugging (6.2) into (A.1), 18  
Finally, substituting (9.1) and (9.2) into (A.2), 
∗ 1288 ̅ ̅                                 1288 .                                                               
Here,  and ̅. 
 
(ii) The social welfare at the optimum condition 
At the optimum,  and . Hence, the demand at the optimum is 
.                                                                                                    A. 4  
Plugging (A.4) into (11), we obtain the welfare function at the optimum as 12  12 . 
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Appendix B: Comparison of two airport fee schemesAppendix B: Comparison of two airport fee schemes 
The difference of the welfare loss under both schemes is 12   12 .                                                            B. 1  
Here, 112 ̅ , 112 ̅ . 
Substituting them into (B.1), we obtain 1288 ̅ ̅  1288 ̅ ̅  1288 ̅ ̅ .            B. 2  
Because , we rewrite the weighted average distance as 
̅
∑
̅ . 
We simplify (B.2) as 
1288 ̅  1 ∑
̅1
 
where ∑ ̅  is the variance of . 
